Monetary vs. social incentives in peer review

Giangiacomo Bravo & Flaminio Squazzoni

http://linnaeus.academia.edu/GiangiacomoBravo giangiacomo.bravo@lnu.se

http://www.eco.unibs.it/gecs/squazzoni.html flaminio.squazzoni@unibs.it



Monetary incentives displace social ones

- Trivial task with no/low/medium levels of payment
- Effort for low levels of payment is lower than in the no-payment case
- Effort for medium levels of payment is just as in the no-payment case
- Non-monetary incentives do not lead to crowding-out effects





Fig. 3. Results from Experiment 2: measured effort (number of balls dragged in 3 min) as a function of payment level (none, low, or medium) and payment form (money or candy).

Heyman & Ariely, *Psychological Science*, 2004



Confirmation of previous results in a "review" case

- Experiment simulating review processes
- Low, generic incentives led to lower fairness than no incentives at all
- Only carefully aligned incentives allow to reach a level of fairness close to the no-incentive situation



Squazzoni et al., Research Policy, 2013

Is a scaling-up realistic?

- ➤ The presence of monetary incentives changes the context of peer review to a "market" situation
- Where the quality of the work depends on the wage level!
- Even assuming that carefully-crafted monetary incentives could work:
 - how is it possible to carefully calibrate the incentive to the referee's effort?
 - how is it possible to offer high incentives to millions of referees every year?
 - who should pay for that? the taxpayers?
 - will monetary incentives offered by some journals "displace" social incentives in others?



Conclusions

- Peer review holds common/public-good characters
- Market as an inefficient provider of public goods
- Material incentives displaced by monetary ones
- Commons literature: management through institutional and social arrangements works
- Working of trust and reputation mechanisms enhanced by carefully designed institutions

